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Until 1991 Central Asia was part of the integrated eco-
nomic space of the Soviet Union without borders and 
with a relatively efficient transport network.  The role 
of the Central Asian republics in the Soviet division of 
labour was as providers of raw materials, primarily cot-
ton, minerals, and energy products.  The major defect 
of the transport network was the poor connectivity to 
the east or south; roads and railways led north or west 
to the Russian republic, and the eastern and southern 
borders of the Soviet Union were effectively closed to1 
trade.2  The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 
1991 was a huge unanticipated shock to Central Asia.  
The following decade was dominated by nation-building 
and the transition from central planning to a market-
based economy.  All of the Central Asian countries 
experienced falling output and increasing inequality 
and poverty.  The region also went through a decade 
of disintegration as border crossing posts were erected 
along frontiers which had been mere lines on a map in 
the Soviet economy.  Transport infrastructure generally 
deteriorated, with road and railway building often focuss-
ing on nationalizing networks rather than improving the 
regional network.3 
A common characteristic of the Central Asian 
countries is their openness, as measured by the ratio 
of exports to GDP (Table 1).  Their exports continue 
to be concentrated in a handful of primary products 
with differing transport requirements.  One reason for 
Uzbekistan’s relatively good economic performance 
between 1992 and 1996 was that its principal exports, 
cotton and gold, have high value/weight ratios and 
1  Professor of Economics, University of Adelaide, Adelaide SA 5005,  
Australia, richard.pomfret@adelaide.edu.au.  Background paper prepared for the second 
Eurasian Emerging Markets Forum meetings in Bern, Switzerland, on 23-25 January 
2010.  I am grateful to Johannes Linn for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2  The only railway line that did not go to Russia was completed in 1990 
between Kazakhstan and China.  In 1997 a rail link between Turkmenistan and Iran was 
opened.  Roads between Central Asia and China were closed after the Sino-Soviet split; 
they only gradually reopened in the 1980s, and were in poor condition.
3  The initial problems and longer term development of Central Asia are 
addressed in my books (Pomfret, 1995; 2006).  Disintegration is analysed in Linn (2004).  
There were many examples of major roads crossing borders for a few kilometres (e.g. the 
Tashkent-Samarkand road goes through Kazakhstan, the Almaty-Shymkent road through 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Jalalabad-Osh road through Uzbekistan); frequent closure 
of borders or rapacious behaviour of traffic police towards foreign vehicles encouraged 
nationalization of networks even though it was wasteful for the region.
could be shipped by air.  Kazakhstan was less fortunate, 
although its coal and minerals, as well as grain from 
northern Kazakhstan, could be exported reasonably well 
along existing rail links.  Oil and gas exports were more 
problematic, because pipelines, the most efficient trans-
port mode, all ran through Russia leaving Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan vulnerable to high transit fees charged 
by the Russian pipeline monopoly and, in the case of 
gas, subject to non-payment by monopsonist buyers.4  
By many measures the Central Asian countries trade 
below their potential, and the returns to integration in the 
global economy in terms of higher living standards have 
been disappointing.5  The most serious transport obsta-
cle was that the combination of shortcomings in hard 
and, especially, soft infrastructure was not conducive to 
the emergence of new exports.6 
Trade in Central Asia is hindered not just by poor 
transport infrastructure.  At least as important are the 
high costs of doing business in Central Asia.  The most 
4  The non-payment problem became so severe that Turkmenistan cut off 
supplies to Ukraine in 1997 and only resumed them in 1999.  Oil exports are less prob-
lematic because there is a world market and transport by rail is a feasible, albeit inferior, 
alternative to pipelines.
5  See, for example, the analysis by the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2006,  
18-21). 
6  Hard infrastructure refers to items usually included under transport 
investment, such as roads, ports, railways, and so forth.  Soft infrastructure refers to the 
set of institutions and practices that affect the costs of doing trade, such as customs 
procedures, trade-related finance or IT services; improvements in soft infrastructure are 






Oil, minerals, iron 
and steel, grain
Kyrgyz 
Republic 42 45 Gold, cotton
Tajikistan 23 21 Aluminium, cotton
Turkmenistan 72 63 Gas, cotton
Uzbekistan 38 40 Cotton, gold, gas
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators at www.worldbank.org.
Openness and Major Exports









































commonly used measures are the World Bank’s survey-
based indicators reported in Table 2.  The overall Ease 
of Doing Business rankings highlight the gap between 
conditions in the more and less reformed economies, 
with Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan all 
ranking higher than, for example, Italy.  The ease of trad-
ing across borders indicators, however, paint a much 
bleaker picture with all five countries in Table 2 ranking 
among the bottom 30 of the 183 countries covered.  
They also rank among the bottom third of countries 
by logistics performance.  Other commonly used 
indicators such as the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report, the Heritage Foundation’s 
Index of Economic Freedom, and the Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index indicate a 
business environment in Central Asia among the poorest 
in the world.7
On the positive side, traditional trade barriers such 
7  As with any survey-based indicators, the individual rankings should be 
taken with a pinch of salt (e.g. that Uzbekistan has better conditions than Kazakhstan 
for international traders does not fit with casual observation), but the general picture of 
the region being unfriendly to international traders is highly credible.  Denis de Tray’s 
paper for the January 2010 Emerging Markets Forum analyses these rankings in greater 
depth, and emphasises the gap between good regulations on paper (as in the Kyrgyz 
Republic) and actual implementation, as well as the universally high levels of corruption in 
Central Asia according to all international comparisons.  Many sources omit Turkmeni-
stan because it is difficult to identify just how hard it is to do business there, but when 
Turkmenistan is included it invariably ranks close to last in the world.
as tariffs are low in Central Asia and preferential trading 
arrangements are of minimal importance.  Most trade 
is conducted on a multilateral basis in world markets, 
although only one Central Asian country has joined the 
World Trade Organization.  The Kyrgyz Republic was 
in 1998 the first Soviet successor state to join the WTO 
and its trade policy continues to be characterized by 
low tariffs.  Kazakhstan’s negotiations are in the final 
stages, but the political will to reach a conclusion has 
been lacking.8  Uzbekistan applied for WTO membership 
in 1994, but negotiations continue to move at a glacial 
pace.  Tajikistan applied in 2001 and a Factual Summary 
of the country’s policies was tabled in 2005, putting its 
negotiations ahead of Uzbekistan’s.  Turkmenistan has 
not applied.  The Central Asian leaders have been more 
active in signing a plethora of regional arrangements, 
many of which have contained reference to free trade 
areas, customs unions or common economic space, 
but the only one to have any impact is the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEc) and its preferential tariff 
arrangements are modest in practice.9 
By the turn of the century the essentials of nation-
building and transition from central planning were com-
plete, albeit with very varied and imperfect market-based 
economies.  The next decade saw rapid growth in the 
region, but with widening disparities as Kazakhstan 
and, to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
benefited from the oil and commodity price boom, while  
resource-poor Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic fared 
less well.  Serious interest in improving the regional 
transport network dates from the mid-2000s, stimulated 
by a series of reports from multilateral organizations that 
highlighted the economic shortcomings of existing trade, 
transport and transit arrangements (World Bank, 2004; 
UNDP, 2005; ADB, 2006).
8  A draft Working Party Report, usually the final stage of accession negotia-
tions, was completed in 2005, and since then Kazakhstan’s accession has been expected 
“next year”.  There was a theory that Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia would coordinate 
their accession, but Ukraine joined the WTO in 2008.  Russia’s negotiations appear to be 
on hold.
9  Although EurAsEc claims that a large number of tariff lines have been uni-
fied to create a common external tariff, these are non-controversial items with low or zero 
tariffs.  If the Kyrgyz Republic or Kazakhstan were to raise their tariffs to Russian levels, 
they would suffer serious welfare loss (Tumbarello, 2005).  Moreover, the Kyrgyz Republic 





Azerbaijan 38 177 111
Kazakhstan 63 182 133
Kyrgyz 
Republic 41 154 103
Tajikistan 152 179 146
Uzbekistan 150 174 129
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2010 http://www.doingbusiness.org/
EconomyRankings/ and LPI http://info.worldbank.org/etools/tradesurvey/mode1b.
asp?sorder=lpirank&cgroup=0#.
Notes: the Doing Business rankings cover 183 countries in the period June 2008 to 
May 2009; the LPI covers 150 countries in 2007; Turkmenistan is not ranked but 
clearly has the worst conditions in Central Asia.
Ease of Doing Business and 
Logistics Performance Index (LPI)






































Central Asia’s international trade has expanded 
rapidly since 2000 (Table 3), led by energy exports from 
Kazakhstan and by imports from China.  Tajikistan’s 
trade deficit is largely financed by remittances.  The 
Kyrgyz Republic earns service income as a regional 
entrepot, selling Chinese goods in two huge bazaars to 
customers from other Central Asian countries, principally 
Uzbekistan, although the size of intra-Central Asian 
trade in Chinese goods is difficult to measure.10  The 
expansion of trade is both cause and consequence 
of improvements in hard and soft infrastructure and of 
more positive official attitudes towards institutions such 
as CAREC.  Nevertheless, as Table 2 highlights, much 
still needs to be done to bring the ease of trading across 
Central Asia’s borders up to global norms.
Questions to be asked
The benefits of trade for development are almost univer-
sally accepted.  Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan adopted 
10  The measurement problem is clearly visible in mirror statistics.  China 
reported exports to the Kyrgyz Republic of $9,213 million in 2008, while the Kyrgyz statis-
tics indicate imports of $728  million from China; in principle, import value should exceed 
export values in bilateral trade because they include transport, insurance and other costs, 
but China’s reported exports are more than twelve times as large as Kyrgyz reported 
imports (Mogilevsky, 2009, Table 5).  The large discrepancy may reflect underreporting by 
Kyrgyz customs, but with low tariffs there is little incentive for smuggling into the Kyrgyz 
Republic.  More plausible is that a large share of the Chinese exports are re-exported and 
thus not counted as imports by the Kyrgyz authorities (Kaminski and Raballand, 2009), 
but the extent of re-exports is not picked up in other countries’ import data because 
there are incentives to smuggle into the more regulated economies of Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan.  The two bazaars are Dordoi outside Bishkek and Karasu outside Osh.
import-substituting industrialization strategies in the 
1990s, but these have not yielded benefits and have 
become less prominent.  All of the Central Asian coun-
tries wish to reduce dependence on a handful of primary 
products by diversifying their economies, and would 
like the growth of these new products to be export-led.  
This raises the question of what kind of goods could be 
exported and what is the appropriate transport network?   
Without advocating “picking winners”, it is important to 
consider the relationship between comparative advan-
tage and mode of transport to determine whether invest-
ment should be in road and rail links to ocean ports or in 
airports and related logistics.   
A more dramatic way of rephrasing the question is 
to ask: Does Central Asia have the potential to become 
the crossroads of Eurasia or is it condemned to being 
a landlocked backwater?  The answer, which depends 
upon the interaction between geographical givens, 
modes of transport and the commodity composition of 
trade, is critical for determining what kind of transport 
infrastructure is appropriate.
The current approach advocated by Central Asian 
Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and the 
UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central 
Asia (SPECA) and by regional organizations such as 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) or the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is to promote 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Kazakhstan - exports 8.8 8.6 9.7 12.9 19.9 27.8 38.2 47.8 71.2
Kazakhstan - imports 5.0 6.4 6.6 8.4 12.6 17.4 23.7 32.8 37.8
Kyrgyz Republic - exports 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.6
Kyrgyz Republic - imports 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.4 4.1
Tajikistan - exports 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.5 1.4
Tajikistan - imports 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.3
Uzbekistan - exports 2.8 2.8 2.5 3.2 4.3 4.7 5.6 8.0 10.4
Uzbekistan - imports 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.7 3.4 3.7 4.4 6.3 7.1
Source: Mogilevsky, 2009, from UN COMTRADE database
Trade of Central Asian Countries, 2000-8 (billion US dollars)





































transport corridors, with the idea of improving both hard 
and soft infrastructure along the corridors.  This permits 
a gradual approach, led by the more willing participants.  
It also raises the question of whether transport corridors 
can become economic corridors rather than just means 
of getting goods from A to B and, if so, how can this be 
promoted?
There are also institutional questions about the role 
of multilateral agencies or regional organizations in bro-
kering cooperation among national governments which 
have shown little taste for cooperation over the last two 
decades.  Is the substantial overlap of the corridors of 
CAREC, SPECA, EurAsEc and the SCO healthy organi-
zational synergy or wasteful duplication?11  Given the 
limited resources and the high cost of transport invest-
ment over the large distances of Central Asia, how can 
private sector funds be mobilized to supplement domes-
tic and international public financing, and will the global 
economic downturn of 2008-9 impact on funding?
What is the right approach when some countries 
do not participate in regional schemes to improve 
transport and trade, or maintain closed borders?  The 
isolationism of Turkmenistan under President Niyazov, 
aka Turkmenbashi the Great, is a major reason why 
the railway south to Iran has had minimal economic 
importance; Turkmenistan’s position has eased since 
Turkmenbashi’s death in December 2006, but the 
approach of President Berdymukamedov remains 
unclear.  Uzbekistan, at the heart of Central Asia, is 
less open and liberal with respect to transit than its 
neighbours would like.  Should transport networks 
be designed to avoid recalcitrant states, and to what 
extent should networks be planned in the geographically 
optimal way, leaving open the option of bringing in non-
participants at a future date?  The question is especially 
apposite given the super-presidential political regimes 
11  The situation is complicated by differing but overlapping membership.  
Turkmenistan is only in SPECA. Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan are in all four groupings, but Uzbekistan ceased to participate in EurAsEc in 2008.  
EurAsEc includes Russia and Belarus, the SCO includes Russia and China, and CAREC 
includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China and Mongolia.  All five Central Asian countries, 
together with Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, are also members of the 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), but ECO’s actual impact is minimal.
and the possibility of major policy shifts when the current 
incumbents are no longer in power.
The Crossroads of Eurasia?
In the thirteenth century, when the pax mongolica follow-
ing Genghis Khan’s establishment of the largest land-
empire in history permitted long distance trade between 
East Asia and Europe, Central Asia lay at the crossroads 
of Eurasia (Findlay and O’Rourke, 2007).  The Silk Road, 
which involved several corridors, passed through Central 
Asia connecting Europe and western Asia with China.  
Bukhara and Samarkand became among the great cit-
ies of the world.  Then, the Portuguese discovered sea 
routes to East Asia.  Central Asia became a fragmented 
and unstable backwater of despotic emirs until it was 
absorbed into the Russian Empire and subsequently 
became part of the Soviet Union.
When the Central Asian countries became inde-
pendent in 1991, they revived the imagery of a new silk 
road and the Crossroads of Asia.  However, although it 
is geographically at the centre of Eurasia, Central Asia is 
hardly a major crossroads.  At current prices, overland 
transport from China to Europe is not price-competitive.  
According to estimates by the Eurasian Development 
Bank  (Table 4), the cost of sending a container by rail 
from Shanghai to Moscow is roughly double the cost 
of sending a container by sea from Shanghai to St. 

















Source: Vinokurov et al., 2009, 32.
Container Freight Tariffs 
China to Western Europe





































pronounced if the container were loading in Japan or 
South Korea or going to Western Europe.  The only 
advantage that overland transport has is time (Table 4).
The “Crossroads of Asia” was a slogan of Uzbekistan 
Airways in the 1990s. Uzbekistan Airways flourished in 
the 1990s as a backpacker airline from Europe to India 
and East Asia, and Tashkent is still a hub for Indians trav-
elling to western Europe, but it is hardly a major hub and 
is threatened by competition from direct flights as India 
deregulates its airline industry and efficient new carriers 
emerge.  Today Central Asian air transport is generally 
inconvenient and expensive, and nobody would transit 
the region if travelling between Europe and Asia.  If there 
is a Central Asia hub it is Istanbul airport, as the western 
gateway to Central Asia.
However, some of these comparisons reflect the 
poor state of transport infrastructure in Central Asia.  
Air Astana has shown how a new efficient airline could 
contribute to making Almaty a passenger hub, although 
it is so far more important in improving the price/quality 
competitiveness of travelling to and within Kazakhstan.  
Almaty and Astana are hubs for Western air cargo ship-
pers such as Lufthansa.
The rail journey may be faster than sea, but it is 
slower than it should be for the distance involved.  
Between Shanghai and the EU border (Poland) there 
are two changes of gauge and four border crossings, all 
of which can be painfully slow.  Add in low quality track 
and there is a classic mixture of poor soft and hard infra-
structure combining to make the rail option more unat-
tractive than it should be.  Indeed, whereas sea should 
potentially be the less reliable option due to bad weather 
and piracy, rail times are even more variable.12  With bet-
ter track and rolling stock and less delay at the borders, 
the rail time could be much less than fifteen days from 
China to Europe, and hence competitive, especially if the 
final destination is an inland town rather than close to a 
12  Chinese sources cite longer times than in Table 4, e.g. The China Economic 
Review reports 30 days from Shanghai to Moscow - http://www.chinaeconomicreview.
com/logistics/2006/11/16/soyuztranslink-china-moscow-rail-freight-services/  Early 
efforts at monitoring CAREC corridors have found that average speeds of trains between 
China and Russia through Central Asia are less than half those in Western Europe.
seaport. 13
On some routes road transport is competitive for 
some freight.  On a map the E40 runs from Berlin to 
Tashkent and large European trucks do use this route, 
especially from Poland and Ukraine to Uzbekistan.  
However, the traffic is not heavy because hundreds of 
kilometres of the road are unpaved across the desert 
of western Kazakhstan and the Karakalpak region of 
Uzbekistan, and in the middle of this bleak stretch is 
an inhospitable border crossing point.14  As with the 
rail network, Central Asian roads need both physical 
improvement and better soft infrastructure - not just 
easier border crossing, but also less regulatory restric-
tion on axle weights, transit conditions and so forth, and 
less harassment by police.
In sum, dramatic images of new silk roads or conti-
nental crossroads present a misleading picture.  Central 
Asia’s location advantages are not those of the four-
teenth century.  Today overland transport cannot match 
ocean shipping costs for bulk goods that are not time-
sensitive.  Nevertheless, the picture need not be bleak.  
Central Asia is surrounded by some of the world’s most 
dynamic economies and some long distance transport 
can be competitive if it is efficient.  The challenge is to 
identify comparative advantages in transport as well as 
in trade.  That will require public policy and public invest-
ment because transport is an area of large fixed costs 
and positive externalities, but in a way that allows market 
forces to guide decisions.  The top-down planning 
and collaboration needs to be flexible enough to avoid 
compounding wasteful spending on unnecessary infra-
structure while allowing responsiveness to unforeseen 
demand for increased capacity on certain routes or by 
certain modes.  The current approach to this challenge 
13  The United Nations Development Programme (2005) human development 
report for Central Asia estimated that costs and time could be halved for “normal” trans-
port conditions.  World Bank estimates of the benefits from feasible road improvements 
also find that transport costs could be halved (Shepherd and Wilson, 2006).
14  Trucks can wait for hours at both the Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan border 
crossing points, even though the traffic is light.  To add to the inconvenience the two 
countries make little effort to coordinate the opening times of the two border posts.  As 
part of its current investment in infrastructure improvement, Kazakhstan is upgrading its 
section of this route as well as the spur to the port of Aktau, but international truckers 
will still have to cross the inhospitable border and face several hundred kilometres of 




































in Central Asia is to identify corridors for priority invest-
ment combined with trade facilitation.
The Corridor Approach
The first attempt to create corridors across Central 
Asia was the Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-
Central Asia (TRACECA) programme established by 
the EU in 1993 to develop an efficient and integrated 
transit transport system between Europe, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia.15  The timing in the 1990s was not 
conducive to cooperation among the Central Asian gov-
ernments and the focus on transport from Central Asia 
to Europe via Baku and Poti, involving ferry crossings of 
the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea, ran into problems 
of competitiveness; freight costs from Tashkent to 
Europe via Baku are almost double rail freight costs 
via Russia.  The TRACECA route carries mainly oil, 
plus some cotton and grains, but operates well below 
projected capacity.  Apart from funding and managerial 
problems, TRACECA’ s fatal flaw is its promotion of a 
route which is ill-suited to most freight due to the two 
sea crossings, and not helped by the isolationist policies 
of Turkmenistan which has the main Central Asian port 
on the Caspian.
During the 1990s and early 2000s it became 
increasingly clear that the obstacles to international trade 
in Central Asia were not just poor physical infrastruc-
ture.  Police and customs officials supplemented their 
incomes through bribes; e.g. a much publicized figure, 
of doubtful provenance but plausible to many observers, 
was that a truck travelling north from Bishkek would pay 
$1700 in bribes by the time it had crossed the Russian 
border.16  As borders became less porous, visa regimes 
were introduced, and trade regulations and taxes were 
frequently changed, the cost and risks of international 
trade mounted in the early 2000s.  If trade were to be 
15  The Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of 
the Europe – the Caucasus – Asia Corridor was signed in Baku on 8 September 1998 
by twelve countries, including four from Central Asia and Azerbaijan; Turkmenistan was 
subsequently included in TRACECA.
16  In the worst case, the high costs discouraged trade completely.  The 
example of the cessation of Kyrgyz onion exports to Russia is described in my book 
(Pomfret, 2006, Chapter 10.4).
promoted, the soft infrastructure of trade facilitation had 
to be improved as well as the hard infrastructure of rail, 
road air and sea ports.
The Asian Development Bank took an important 
lead in November 1999 by designing a Cross-Border 
Agreement (CBA) which accompanied its financing of 
upgrading of the Almaty-Bishkek road.  Under the CBA, 
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz governments made commit-
ments to facilitate border-crossing procedures.  The 
ADB acted as honest broker, balancing and monitoring 
the commitments, but more importantly the agreement 
highlighted the connection between investment in hard 
infrastructure and improvement of soft infrastructure.17  
On a large scale, the ADB played similar roles in the 
evolution of CAREC.18 
CAREC’s Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy 
coalesced around identification of a number of cor-
ridors, along which donor activity would be coordinated 
(Figure 1).19  The corridor concept was also taken up by 
the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).20  The EU 
has, since 2007, also tried to reorient its main regional 
program in Central Asia (BOMCA-CADAP) from border 
management to control the drug trade towards a more 
balanced risk assessment to facilitate legal trade as well 
as prevent illicit trade.
Why corridors?  Corridors combine investment in 
17  The ADB’s November 2008 validation report on the Almaty-Bishkek Re-
gional Road Rehabilitation Project  is available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/
Validation/KAZ/in386-08.pdf
18  CAREC members are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China (represented by the 
national government, for projects in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia), Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and six multilateral institution partners: the 
ADB, which hosts the Secretariat, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank.
19  The CAREC Transport and Trade Facilitation Strategy approved at the 6th 
Ministerial Conference in Dushanbe in November 2007 identified six priority transport 
corridors, potentially linking Central Asian countries with each other and with their 
neighbours from China to Europe, and from the Indian Subcontinent to Russia (CAREC, 
2007).  The Action Plan identified a set of priority investment projects and technical 
assistance initiatives to be implemented over the next decade to improve the multi-modal 
transport network and border crossing, transit and logistics management along the prior-
ity corridors, and also envisaged monitoring of transport cost and time along the corridors 
in order to ensure that the investments actually secured the intended benefits. Financing, 
estimated at $21 billion for investments and $69 million for technical assistance, was to 
come from countries’ own resources, from loans and grants by the multilateral institu-
tions, and from other external financing (Linn, 2008).




































hard and soft infrastructure, and are amenable to moni-
toring (e.g. by time-cost studies of a standardized truck 
or container) which permits ex post evaluation of policy 
actions and identification of opportunities for further 
incremental change.  Monitoring is feasible (and pilot 
studies have already been completed), and provides 
information for evidence-based policy evaluation.21  
The corridors currently identified by CAREC/
EurAsEc/SCO have important advantages over 
TRACECA.  The number of corridors provides flexibility, 
although this must be balanced against concerns about 
diffusion of effort and resources.  Whereas TRACECA 
focused fairly single-mindedly on improving rail freight 
transfer from Central Asia to Europe via Baku, the cur-
rent corridors permit multiple use and priorities can 
respond to demand.  The Almaty-Bishkek road upgrade 
was an important project because that three-hour drive 
between the capital of the Kyrgyz Republic and the 
financial and commercial centre of Kazakhstan is used 
for many reasons, some local-trade-related, some pro-
moting longer distance trade (e.g. allowing business visi-
tors to Bishkek to use the better-served Almaty airport22) 
and some only indirectly related to trade.  The first major 
investments in the CAREC corridors have been on the 
stretch of Corridor 1 between Almaty and Shymkent, 
which is part of a China-Russia corridor, but is also the 
main Almaty-Tashkent road and principal artery of south-
ern Kazakhstan.
Such flexibility is more in tune with 21st century 
economics than the top-down approach of TRACECA 
in which EU planners appeared to replace Soviet 
21  The value of the corridors approach has been illustrated by World Bank 
projects in Africa.  Examining the costs associated with transporting goods on four 
corridors involving thirteen countries of which seven are landlocked, Teravaninthorn and 
Raballand (2009) find that transportation costs along these corridors are much higher 
than in other developing countries and that the difference is due to informal payments 
and high profits earned by trucking companies; the main source of high profit margins is 
regulations that restrict entry of new companies.  Teravaninthorn and Raballand point to 
Rwanda as an example of a landlocked country that deregulated its transport sector and 
quickly benefited from a dramatic drop in transport prices.  For Zambia, regional liberal-
ization of trucking services had a significant impact on transport costs (Raballand, Kunaka 
and Giersing, 2008).  These studies emphasise the importance of gathering evidence and 
publicizing the benefits of reform in order to motivate policymakers in the face of vested 
interests which benefit from trade-restricting regulations.
22  The KLM Amsterdam-Almaty, for example, is met by a connecting bus ser-
vice to Bishkek.  Many travellers to destinations in the northern Kyrgyz Republic organize 
a car to meet them at Almaty airport.
planners.  Public/private cooperation has so far been 
limited, but national/multilateral cooperation is flourish-
ing.  The Almaty-Shymkent road upgrade is progressing 
because the Kazakhstan government sees value in the 
project.  China’s designation of Inner Mongolia, as well 
as Xinjiang, as a CAREC region reflects national interest 
in promoting links with southern Mongolia.  Although 
public/private cooperation has yet to emerge and the 
global slowdown in trade in 2009 does not provide a 
favourable environment for  private investment, specific 
projects could be important for individual investors, e.g. 
the Mongolia - Inner Mongolia connection may attract 
financing by Rio Tinto which is anxious to build a rail link.
Flexibility is important because a map such as 
that presented by Johannes Linn at the First Eurasian 
Emerging Market Forum meeting in 2009 can be inter-
preted in different ways (Figure 2).  As well as being a 
crossroads between Asia and Europe, Central Asia can 
be seen as a location favoured by a neighbourhood 
of booming economies.   Much debate about Central 
Asian transport has concerned the disadvantage of 
landlockedness and access to ocean ports.  This is 
important for some products, but the domestic markets 
of China, India, Iran, Russia and Turkey could be at least 
as important as access to these countries’ ports.
The ideal transport network for Central Asia would 
have good quality road and rail connections in all of 
these directions, so that the countries could reori-
ent their trade as one neighbour boomed or another 
experienced disruption.  It would also involve efficient 
air services for time-sensitive or high value-weight items 
and a pipeline network for oil and gas.  The prospect of 
export diversification into products and markets that are 
difficult to predict highlights the need to retain flexibility 
to improve any mode of transport to any market.
Flexibility is also important for addressing the issue 
of what to do when a Central Asian state closes itself 
off or makes transit unattractive.  A denser network or 
a menu of corridors provide alternatives.  The develop-
ment of Aktau port on Kazakhstan’s Caspian shore, for 




































without passing through Turkmenistan and this was also 
used by Uzbekistan, some of whose trade has been 
diverted to this route which is longer but less trouble-
some than using Turkmenbashi port.  Uzbekistan’s 
restrictive border policies encouraged the Kyrgyz 
Republic to nationalize its road network so that the main 
Osh-Bishkek road no longer passes through Uzbekistan, 
and has encouraged Tajikistan to use routes via Osh and 
Almaty rather than via Tashkent.
In sum, transport development in Central Asia 
should be multi-vectored, serving cross-regional trade, 
linking Central Asia to ocean ports, neighbouring 
economies and regional markets, and promoting more 
local trade.  Effective transport corridors, responding to 
actual and latent demand should have the potential to 
become economic corridors.  At a minimum (and in the 
more isolated stretches of roads across deserts this is 
the most that can be expected) the economic spillovers 
will involve service stations and food outlets, but else-
where as has happened along the Almaty-Bishkek road 
(especially in the link to Almaty airport) there are oppor-
tunities to develop economic growth poles with superior 
logistics.  In the longer term, the corridors will hopefully 
become part of an efficient transport network, and the 
nodes or densely travelled sections should be attractive 
locations for businesses that do not require city centre 
locations.
Institutional Roles
Multilateral agencies or regional organizations can play 
a role in kick-starting regional cooperation in a region 
where cooperation has been in short supply over the 
last two decades.  Regional cooperation is important 
because connectivity within the region and to large 
economies surrounding Central Asia is the necessary 
first step to integrate the region into the global economy.  
This can only be bypassed by air transport, which is only 
really suited to a narrow range of goods.
CAREC has been the most successful of multilateral 
initiatives because it started low-key and established 
itself through a long period of confidence-building.23  
Whether the projects now being funded by CAREC part-
ners would have happened without CAREC is an open 
but almost irrelevant question, because raising issues 
(e.g. the importance of soft infrastructure) and bringing 
senior officials and then ministers together was the cru-
cial role played by CAREC.  Similarly, whether CAREC 
or EurAsEc or the SCO can claim credit for investment 
along, say, CAREC corridor 1, which all three recognize 
as a major corridor, is less important than their joint 
efforts to promote the concept and encourage national 
participation and cooperation.
Funding is obviously important.  The last decade has 
witnessed a huge divergence in economic prosperity in 
Central Asia as relative growth rates were overwhelm-
ingly determined by oil and gas output.  Kazakhstan can 
afford to fund key national projects and is in the process 
of improving its national transport network, while the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan remain impoverished and 
will require soft loans or grants if many key projects are 
to be completed.
The Annex reviews the current state of projects 
along the six CAREC corridors.
Pipelines
The most contentious and highly publicized elements of 
Central Asian trade and transport have been pipelines.  
The region is rich in oil and gas, for which pipelines are 
the least-cost means of transport, but large construc-
tion costs mean that only a limited number of pipelines 
are justified.  The mutually exclusive nature of pipelines 
and Central Asia’s location have led to pipeline projects 
becoming the stuff of high politics.
At independence, all pipelines led to Russia and 
were controlled by Transneft.  The first oil pipeline from 
the Caspian not under Trasneft control opened in 2001 
and the first to bypass Russia, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
23  CAREC’s origins lay in some regional projects in the ADB in the late 1990s, 
creation of the Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation Unit in 2000, and establish-
ment of the current institutional structure in 2001.  CAREC meetings involve senior 
officials and ministers.  In contrast the United Nations Special Programme for Central Asia 





































pipeline, opened in 2005.  A pipeline through 
Kazakhstan to China will be completed soon.  These 
oil pipelines mean that Kazakhstan now benefits from 
a competitive environment in transporting and selling 
its oil, so that revenue is equal to the world price minus 
transit fees that are related to cost rather than monopoly 
power.
The situation with respect to gas pipelines is more 
complex.  There are no feasible alternatives to pipelines 
for exporting Central Asian natural gas, and the network 
remains dominated by Russian routes.  A small pipeline 
was opened from Turkmenistan to Iran in 1997, but only 
recently has a second non-Russian pipeline begun to 
be constructed from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan to China.  A major ongoing political 
debate concerns new pipeline routes from Central Asia 
and Russia to the EU, with the issue being whether the 
Nabucco project through Turkey is more desirable than 
investment in pipelines from Russia.  An added compli-
cation is that technological change is reducing the cost 
of liquid natural gas (LNG) transportation, which will ben-
efit producers such as Qatar and Australia and seriously 
erode the competitive position of landlocked producers 
such as those of Central Asia.24 
The economics of pipelines are relatively straightfor-
ward, although in practice there are large uncertainties 
in predicting future oil and gas prices.25  For the Central 
Asian energy suppliers, the key trade-off is between 
the scale economies and guaranteed prices offered 
by existing Russian routes and the benefits of multiple 
routes in increasing bargaining power and in being able 
24  The major constraint on LNG is the high cost of constructing liquefication 
plant at the point of shipment and regasification plant at the point of arrival.  Technological 
change is lowering these costs and western European countries such as Spain, Britain 
and Italy have been investing in regasification plant; the South Hook plant in South Wales 
that opened in 2009 is Europe’s largest, and Italy has recently finished or is constructing 
three large offshore plant that can process over 20 billion cubic metres a year, equal to 
deliveries through a large pipeline and important because Italy is a major intended market 
for Nabucco gas.  These developments will allow countries with large gas reserves and 
port access (e.g. Qatar and Australia) to be highly competitive in European markets given 
the low ocean-shipping costs relative to the high cost of constructing pipelines.
25  Pipeline construction is more attractive when prices are high; construction 
was limited in the period of low energy prices up to 1998 and then accelerated with 
rising oil prices.  Oil prices are determined in world markets.  Gas prices are agreed in 
long-term contracts, although in practice they respond to large changes in oil prices as 
contracts are revised. 
to respond flexibly to any disruption in particular routes.  
For EU customers, the conflict is between reducing 
dependence on Russian routes (e.g., by promoting 
the Nabucco project) and keeping good relations with 
Russia.  If the EU’s increasing capacity to import LNG 
reduces demand for gas from Russia and Central Asia, 
then the natural gas sector in Central Asia will face 
serious competitive pressures, reinforcing the need for 
export diversification.
Problems
Landlockedness is often seen as a problem for Central 
Asia but it could be a strength; the importance of a land-
locked country’s economic neighbourhood is illustrated 
by Switzerland.  Taking advantage of opportunities 
requires a transport network and regional arrange-
ments that facilitate trade.  The weaknesses are that 
large distances and inhospitable terrain in Central Asia 
mean that construction costs can be high, and national 
governments have not been cooperative in promoting an 
efficient regional network. Also there are serious prob-
lems of governance – which contribute to the inefficiency 
of cross-border trade and transit arrangements.
Despite the natural ties of a shared culture, history 
and economic structure and obvious shared problems 
such as managing the water resources of the two 
rivers flowing into the Aral Sea, the record of regional 
cooperation in Central Asia since 1991 has been a 
sorry tale.  Despite many statements of intent and 
grand plans, there is no regional institution based in 
Central Asia.  Four or five of the Central Asian countries 
belong to three regional institutions but these all have 
their secretariats outside Central Asia and tend to be 
driven by the host country: the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEc - secretariat in Moscow), the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO - secretariat in 
Beijing), and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO 
- secretariat in Tehran).26  Cooperation was inhibited by 
sensitivity about newly won sovereignty and by personal 
26  The secretariat of CAREC is run by the Asian Development Bank out of 




































tensions between the autocratic presidents.  Some of 
these negative forces may be ebbing, but as with any 
falling out among previously close relations an intermedi-
ary may be necessary to help heal the rift.
Even when projects are presented as regional, the 
actual expenditures may be dominated by national 
priorities.  The CAREC-sponsored investment along 
corridor 1 from China to Europe via Russia (see Annex) 
is effectively for improvement of the Kazakhstan road 
system.  Upgrading  the Amaty-Shymkent road con-
nects the major cities of southern Kazakhstan.  The 
upgrade cuts out a short section that currently passes 
through the Kyrgyz Republic; the rerouting will facilitate 
trade by eliminating the need to cross borders, but it 
will reduce regional integration by isolating the area of 
the Kyrgyz Republic that now benefits from being on a 
major international road.  Thus, what is by far the larg-
est actual outcome from the corridors approach could 
easily be presented as part of Kazakhstan’s upgrade 
of its national road system with help from international 
financial institutions.27  That is not necessarily a bad 
thing, but it is not regional cooperation and concentrat-
ing benefits in Central Asia’s richest country will widen 
economic disparities.28 
Conclusions
In Central Asia geography looms large, and presents 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats.
The strength of Central Asia’s location is that it is 
surrounded by some of the world’s fastest growing 
economies (including three of the past decade’s fast-
growing BRICs).  Parts of Central Asia could potentially 
have good links to areas of these dynamic economies by 
road, rail or short flights.
The weaknesses are Central Asia’s inherited 
27  That is, of course, not how the multilateral institutions that are CAREC 
partners present their financial assistance; see the Asian Development Bank http://www.
adb.org/media/Articles/2008/12702-kazakhstan-silk-road/ or the EBRD’s press release 
on its $180 million loan financing a section north of Aktobe - http://www.ebrd.com/new/
pressrel/2009/090330.htm
28  Kazakhstan’s national transport plans also include construction/upgrading 
of local roads feeding into the major long-distance roads, which is likely to enhance the 
value of major road projects and can help to turn transport corridors into economic cor-
ridors.
transport network designed to fit the needs of Soviet 
planners rather than market-driven globalized econo-
mies and its landlockedness which inhibits taking advan-
tage of cheap maritime transport.  The weaknesses have 
been exacerbated over the last two decades by nation-
building and the severe economic downturn of the 
1990s.  There were inadequate resources to maintain, 
let alone upgrade, the inherited transport system, and 
some scarce resources went on nationalizing transport 
networks rather than improving the regional network.  
Perhaps more importantly the regulation of national bor-
ders, search for public revenue through levies on traders 
and spread of petty corruption all increased the cost of 
doing trade, while sensitivity to newly acquired sover-
eignty and  personal antipathies among the autocratic 
leaders inhibited regional cooperation.  By the 2000s the 
costs of trade were higher than almost anywhere else in 
the world due to a disadvantageous mix of poor physical 
(or ‘hard’) infrastructure and high transactions costs (or 
poor ‘soft’ infrastructure).
The opportunities lie in the potential for substan-
tially reducing the costs of trading and increasing the 
volume and gains from trade.  This is first and foremost 
a task for national governments, who as everywhere 
have primary responsibility for maintaining the physical 
infrastructure and who alone can reduce the red tape 
and attack the corruption that increases trade costs.  
Multilateral institutions, bilateral donors and NGOs can 
also play an important role.  During the 1990s Central 
Asia was relatively neglected among the countries in 
transition from central planning, but since the turn of the 
century the multilateral institutions have played a more 
positive role, especially under the CAREC umbrella, in 
confidence building, in bringing officials together to dis-
cuss best practice, in preparing reports to highlight the 
benefits from improvements in transport and trade con-
ditions, and in coordinating external financial assistance.
The threats are internal and external.  Internally 
the political systems in all five countries are super-
presidential, which permits strong action once the 




































which may be associated with policies that benefit the 
leader or the elite rather than the country as a whole 
(as in Turkmenistan under President Niyazov).  The high 
degree of concentration of power also creates uncer-
tainty about the sustainability of policies given the mor-
tality (or perhaps exposure to coups) of the presidents.  
The external threat is that great powers both within and 
beyond the region may view Central Asia in terms of 
their geopolitical strategy rather than in the interest of the 
region’s people.  Fears that a new ‘Great Game’ would 
emerge after 1991 were generally not realized, but since 
the turn of the century this may be changing with the 
renewed assertiveness of Russia, US military involve-
ment in Afghanistan and Iraq, China’s drive for energy 
and mineral security, and European concerns about 
dependence on Russian gas.
Recommendations
The first two decades after independence witnessed 
disappointing economic performance which was exac-
erbated by policies that worsened or, at best, failed to 
improve the costs of international trade.  Some trade 
neglect is understandable in a period of nation-building 
and other economic priorities associated with the tran-
sitional recession, and the situation is now improving, 
albeit unevenly, across the region.  A top priority in the 
third decade is for national policymakers to be proac-
tive in pursuit of further reducing the costs of trade by 
upgrading both the hard and soft infrastructure.  A good 
starting point, under national control, would be to reduce 
the bureaucratic obstacles that affect all trade.  In 
international trade the focus should be on choke points, 
where the time and cost of trade increases substantially, 
and which can be identified by monitoring the time and 
cost of trade along key corridors.
Donors and multilateral agencies can facilitate this 
process by supporting initiatives such as CAREC and 
by financial support for projects from road-building 
to form reduction to alerting trade officials to best 
practice.  Financial support is particularly critical for the 
poorest Central Asian nations, the Kyrgyz Republic and 
especially Tajikistan.  Multilateral institutions can also 
provide forums for encouraging regional cooperation  
and recognition of aspects of national policies that have 
positive or negative spillovers to neighbouring countries.  
The multilaterals can also provide settings for encourag-
ing evidence-based policy evaluation and follow-up on 
the basis of such evaluation, and in the longer term for 
peer review processes.
What should be avoided is too much top-down 
planning of transport networks.  Some planning and 
coordination is of course necessary, but with scarce 
resources it is important to leave flexibility to respond to 
changing conditions.  All Central Asian countries wish to 
diversify their exports from the current narrow commod-
ity base, but identifying future comparative advantage is 
difficult and decentralized decision-makers responding 
to market signals are likely to do a better identifying 
job than public servants in national capitals or distant 
secretariats.  Differing new exports will require differing 
transport modes and logistical support, and their viability 
will depend upon the ability of the transport system to 
respond to these commodity-specific needs.  In sum, 
top-down transport planning should be designed to 
leave the maximum feasible scope for bottom-up devel-
opment of the hard and soft infrastructure.
National governments outside the region, and 
groupings such as the G20 or G8, can play their part by 
maintaining open markets.  If Central Asian countries do 
diversity their exports and increase their trade, it will pro-
mote growth in the region and benefit the trading part-
ners.  The benefits will be reduced if importing countries 
respond to producer pressure and impose anti-dumping 
duties or non-tariff barriers on imports from Central Asia.   
Encouraging WTO accession, provided that Central 
Asian countries make credible commitments to abide by 
world trade law, will help to guarantee security of market 





































Status of CAREC Corridors as of CAREC 
Senior Officials Meeting in October 2009
Corridor 1 (Europe - East Asia)
Kazakhstan’s government approved. in February 2008 
the feasibility study for the Western Europe–Western 
PRC Corridor Development Program, which covers 
2,715 km of road on Corridor 1b from the Chinese 
border through Almaty and Shymkent to the Russian 
border north of Aktobe.  CAREC’s multilateral partners 
are providing loans to Kazakhstan to help finance the 
program: $340 million from the Asian Development Bank 
(first tranche of a $700 million multi-tranche financing 
facility approved in November 2008), $180 million from 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(approved in November 2008), $170 million from the 
Islamic Development Bank (approved in February 2009), 
and $2.1 billion from the World Bank (approved in April 
2009).
The Kyrgyz Republic is improving the 488 km road 
section between Bishkek and Torugart on Corridor 1c.  
The ADB approved a $20 million grant in October 2008 
and a $50 million loan/grant in August 2009 to finance 
rehabilitation of a 114 km section.
The PRC is upgrading the 297 km road section 
between Korla and Kuqa on Corridor 1c with ADB 
assistance.  The PRC is also improving the 530 km road 
section between Turpan and Xingxingxia on Corridor 1 
and a 68 km access road to Ala Shankou at the border 
with Kazakhstan.  The PRC is constructing a new 286-
km railway line from Jinghe through Yining to Khorgos in 
Xinjiang for completion in 2009.  The PRC is building a 
large-scale logistics centre in Khorgos, Xinjiang.
Corridor 2 (Mediterranean - East Asia)
Azerbaijan is improving its segment (both roads and rail-
ways) with external assistance.  Rehabilitation of the 85 
km road section between Hajigabul and Kyurdamir was 
completed in 2008 with EBRD assistance.  Improvement 
of the 38 km road section between Qazakh and the 
Georgian border is to be completed in 2009 with ADB 
assistance.  Reconstruction of the 89 km road section 
between Yevlakh and Ganja, via the Ganja bypass, is 
underway with assistance from ADB, IsDB, and the 
Saudi Fund for Development.  Upgrading of the east–
west railway line is underway with assistance from 
the World Bank ($450 million loan approved in 2008).  
Azerbaijan started constructing the Baku International 
Sea Trade Port Complex, using public–private partner-
ship arrangements in 2009.
The ADB is providing assistance for upgrading the 
road from Aktau in Kazakhstan to Guzar in Uzbekistan.  
Kazakhstan is preparing an investment project to 
improve the 540 km road section between Aktau and 
the Uzbekistan border. Uzbekistan is reconstructing 
the 131 km section between the Kazakhstan border 
and Guzar; work on the first 40 km section started 
in October 2009, and bidding for other sections is 
underway.
Corridor 3 (Russian Federation - 
Middle East and South Asia)
Kazakhstan completed a feasibility study on the road 
section between Almaty and Kapchagay in 2008.  A 
concessionaire will manage the section.  Kazakhstan 
completed a feasibility study on the electrification of 
the 650 km railway line between Almaty and Aktogay in 
2008.
Tajikistan is preparing an investment project to 
improve the 66 km road between Dushanbe and 
Bratstvo at the border with Uzbekistan, with ADB 
assistance.
Uzbekistan started building the railway lines between 
Yangier and Djizzak and between Yangier and Fakhad in 
2009, with a total length of about 120 km.
Corridor 4 (Russian Federation–East Asia)
Mongolia is improving road Corridor 4a with ADB assist-
ance.  Rehabilitation of the 431 km section between 
Hovd and Yarant, at the border with PRC, is underway 
with grant funding from ADB.  Mongolia is improving 





































the 428 km section between Choyr and the border with 
PRC is ongoing, and about 40% of civil works have been 
completed.
Mongolia is building a new international airport in 
Ulaanbaatar with a $288 million loan from the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (approved in May 
2008).  Mongolia is also constructing a new runway at 
Olgiy airport along Corridor 4a.
The PRC is upgrading the 179 km railway line 
between Jining and Erenhot in Inner Mongolia, planned 
for completion in 2010.
Corridor 5 (East Asia–Middle East and South Asia)
The Kyrgyz Republic is improving the road sections from 
Irkeshtam, at the Chinese border, through Sary Tash to 
Karamyk, at the border with Tajikistan.  Work on the 136 
km section between Sary Tash and Karamyk, with ADB 
assistance, is about 20% complete.  The 74 km section 
between Irkeshtam and Sary Tash is being improved 
with loans from the PRC.
Tajikistan is improving the road sections between 
Dushanbe and Karamyk at the border with the Kyrgyz 
Republic, with ADB assistance.  Rehabilitation of the 140 
km section between Dushanbe and Nurobod was com-
pleted in 2008.  Physical progress on remaining sections 
is at 70% for the 77 km section between Nurobod and 
Nimich, 73% for the 25 km section between Nimich and 
Sayron, and 40% for the 95 km section between Sayron 
and Karamyk.  Tajikistan is improving the road sections 
between Dushanbe and the border with Afghanistan, 
with assistance from JICA; work on a 12 km section 
between Dusti and Nizhni Pianj was completed in 2008, 
and work on the remaining 15 km section between Dusti 
and Nizhni Pianj and the 15 km section between Kurgan-
Tube and Dusti started in 2009.
The ADB is helping formulate a cross-border agree-
ment among the Kyrgyz Republic, PRC, and Tajikistan.  
The agreement will cover the PRC–Kyrgyz Republic 
border at Irkeshtam, and the Kyrgyz Republic–Tajikistan 
border at Karamyk.  Two negotiating meetings between 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan have been conducted 
in 2009, and a third is scheduled for December 2009.
Corridor 6 (Europe–Middle East and South Asia)
Afghanistan is improving the road sections of corridors 
6a and 6b with assistance from the ADB and IsDB.  The 
55 km section between Naibabad and the border with 
Uzbekistan and the 204 km Naibabad-Andkhoy section 
were rehabilitated in 2008 with ADB funding, and work 
on the 210 km section between Andkhoy and Qaisar is 
targeted for completion in 2009.  Improvement of the 90 
km section between Qaisar and Bala Murghab is 20% 
complete.  Bidding for contracts for constructing a new 
143 km section between Bala Murghab and Leman is 
underway.  The 90 km section between Leman and 
Herat is being improved with IsDB funding.  
The ADB is assisting Afghanistan with a study on 
development of a railway network across the north 
and other parts of the country, including links to Herat, 
Pakistan, and Tajikistan.  In November 2009 Afghanistan 
will start building a 75 km railway line from the border 
with Uzbekistan to Mazar-e-Sharif, with grant support 
from ADB.
Figures:
Figure 1: The CAREC Corridors 
Figure 2: Central Asia at the Center 












































































Central Asia at the Center of Eurasia (from Linn 2009)
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